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Otto Skorzeny, an Austrian SS-member during World War II, is still today famous 
for his conduct of German special operations. His legacy continues to influence military 
theorists and historians because of the success of those operations. Among Skorzeny’s 
most recognizable missions, it was the spectacular liberation of Mussolini in 1943 that 
also launched his career in the conduct of German special operations.  
To answer the question about Skorzeny’s real role in German special operations, 
this thesis surveys Unternehmen Eiche, the German rescue operation for Mussolini and 
Unternehmen Panzerfaust, which targeted the Hungarian Regent Horthy to resign. 
Therefore, primary and secondary sources and memoirs of witnesses, who were part of 
these operations, are compared to Skorzeny’s memoirs, which were often used as primary 
sources in literature about German special operations during World War II. The results 
show that although Skorzeny had in both operations a primary supporting and significant 
strategic impact on several levels, discrepancies exist within the historical accounts. 
Furthermore, the impact of German propaganda and Otto Skorzeny’s autobiographical 
books have bolstered his fame even to the present day. Thus, if academia refer primarily 
to Skorzeny’s memoirs, they may draw an unrealistic picture of his role in the 
development of German WWII special operations. Moreover, other Skorzeny-conducted 
operations should be studied more in depth to further develop the thesis’ findings. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C.  LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
D.  APPROACH ...............................................................................................7 
II.  STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................11 
A.  GENERAL ................................................................................................11 
B.  UNTERNEHMEN EICHE ......................................................................11 




B.  UNTERNEHMEN EICHE ......................................................................25 
C.  UNTERNEHMEN PANZERFAUST .....................................................30 
D.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................33 
IV.  SKORZENY’S STRATEGIC VALUE ..............................................................35 
A.  GERMAN POPULATION ......................................................................35 
B.  SS-VOLUNTEERING/WARFIGHTING..............................................37 
C.  GERMAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE ..................38 
D.  INFLUENCING GERMAN ADVERSARIES ......................................39 
E.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................40 
V.  THE REAL CONDUCT ......................................................................................41 
A.  CONDUCTING UNTERNEHMEN EICHE .........................................41 
B.  CONDUCTING UNTERNEHMEN PANZERFAUST ........................44 
VI.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................47 
APPENDIX. MILITARY RANKS .................................................................................49 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................51 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................57 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NS  Nationalsozialismus, nationalsozialistisch 
 National Socialism, National-Socialist 
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  
 literally: National-Socialist German Workers’ Party 
OSS Office of Strategic Services 
POW prisoner of war 
RFSS  Reichsführer SS 
 Reich Leader-SS 
RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt 
 literally: Reich Main Security Office 
SA Sturmabteilung 
 literally: Storm Detachment 
SD  Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers SS 
 literally: Security Service of the Reich Leader-SS 
SOF Special Operation Forces 
 SS  Schutzstaffel  
 literally: Protection Squadron 
U.S.  United States of America 
WWII  Second World War 
z.b.V. zur besonderen Verwendung 
 literally: for special purpose 
 x




This thesis would not have become real without my advisors, Dr. John Arquilla 
and Dr. Donald Abenheim. I am extremely grateful for their immense patience and 
tremendous engagement, especially because of the given timelines and due dates.  
Dr. Arquilla was fascinated by the idea of this thesis and gave guidance to create a 
picture of Otto Skorzeny, which focuses not just on critique, but also on a holistic view of 
this most recognized German conductor of special operations during World War II. His 
recommendations and ideas gave the thesis its soul. 
Dr. Abenheim provided advice and insights with his deep knowledge about the 
German military. His personal interest in this thesis and his incredible engagement and 
support drove me forward. He heavily influenced large sections and offered an objective 
view of Otto Skorzeny. 
Dr. Kalev I. Sepp’s fascinating courses inspired the idea for this thesis, and I 
would like to thank him for his support in creating and developing the initial steps. 
Furthermore, I am grateful for Dr. Gordon McCormick’s time spent conversing 
passionately about the thesis topic, which gave me great motivation, ideas, and insights. 
Finally, I want to thank the angel who accompanied me not only during the thesis 
development and writing phases, but also during the duration of my studies. Without 
this support and the wings which carried and secured me, without being taught 
about the difference of truth and lies, and without the angel’s trust in me, I would 
have not been able to understand and complete my studies successfully.  
 xii





During World War II and thereafter until today, enthusiasts of the chronicles of 
war have referred to Otto Skorzeny as “the most dangerous man in Europe.”1 The 
Austrian SS-Obersturmbannführer successfully led several high-value-target special 
operations for Germany at the war’s height. He stepped into the WWII limelight to 
become one of the most renowned German officers from this period. After the Allied 
defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, he embarked on his second career, more notable still, 
to use his knowledge and fame in a shadow world of the Cold War. He established a 
reputation for European right-wing activities as a political refugee, he may have 
collaborated with the Israeli Mossad, and overall he crafted a personal legend and legacy. 
He was charged at the Dachau Military Tribunal in August 1945, but was not found 
guilty, and escaped as a fugitive to Spain, where he was secured by the nationalist Franco 
regime to become possibly imprisoned for a time because of his name on the Israeli list of 
German war criminals. There he finally died in 1975, and his remains are interred in the 
family plot in the green splendor of Vienna Doebling, the elegant 19th district. 
Unternehmen Eiche, the rescue of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini at Gran Sasso 
in 1943, was Otto Skorzeny’s primary special operation, which made him famous and 
highly decorated.2 This operation was crucial for Germany, because its success kept part 
of Italy on her side and therefore, prolonged the war in Southern Europe and kept Allied 
Forces from reaching Germany quickly. Comparable to Unternehmen Eiche, the 
successful Unternehmen Panzerfaust–supposedly Skorzeny-led operation–in Budapest in 
1944 targeted the Hungarian Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy.3 The Hungarian negotiation 
with the advancing Soviet Red Army would have cut off German divisions still fighting 
in the Balkans and in the process of withdrawal as well as those units in the East resisting 
                                                 
1 Charles Whiting, Skorzeny, The Most Dangerous Man in Europe (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 
2010). 
2 Operation Oak.  
3 Operation Panzerfaust. 
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the Soviet advance. The success of Unternehmen Panzerfaust and the replacement of the 
Hungarian regent allowed the war in Southeastern Europe to continue with ultimately 
catastrophic results, not least for Hungary, in the final phase of the war. But it did allow 
the successful retreat of nearly a million German soldiers.   
National Socialist propaganda and Otto Skorzeny used these two special 
operations to create a biographical legend, which is still alive and taught today in the 
history of special operations, not so much as an expression of Nazi ideas as of military 
excellence more or less disconnected from biography, politics and society of the time. 
This fact notwithstanding, the time is ripe for a reinterpretation of this story in the 
interests of the historical record. Moreover, there is also a need to join excellence in 
professional military education with the highest standards of historical scholarship, 
especially as that of the German-speaking world has an impact on an English language 
readership. Skorzeny may have used the situational opportunity presented by Nazi 
propaganda at the climax of the war to become famous, but, along with many other 
figures of the world’s biggest war, he also created his own story after the war.4 
Understanding these historical discrepancies between fact and fiction, what was his real 
role in the origin, planning, execution, and aftermath of German high-value-target special 
operations in World War II? 
B. CONTEXT 
For those devoted to the study of special operations and its application in practice 
in a violent world of irregular conflict, the Austrian Otto Skorzeny is akin to Guderian or 
Rommel for mobile warfare in the annals of war. Especially in English-speaking 
countries, where German and Austrian military figures enjoy more fame than at home 
today, his military reputation and fame is enormous. The first time he was recognized 
during World War II was after Nazi propaganda used the successful rescue operation of 
Mussolini in September 1943 to demonstrate the Third Reich’s military resilience and 
sustained power in the face of major strategic setbacks in alliance cohesion as Allied 
                                                 
4 Otto Skorzeny, My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring 
Commando, transl. David Johnson (Atglen, PA: Schiffer 1995). 
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offensives against the Axis unfolded in Southern and Eastern Europe. This operation in 
the Apennine Mountains was a launching pad not only for the Fiesler Storch aircraft that 
rescued the Duce, but for Otto Skorzeny and his global recognition and credit. Before this 
operation, he was an unknown person even in Germany, a common soldier, like many 
other Germans and Austrian men at the time in the ranks of the SS.  
Special operations conducted by Otto Skorzeny always seemed to be successful 
and were employed by German propaganda, but were likewise well reported by Allied 
Forces and their home press. Every individual operation became a stepping-stone for Otto 
Skorzeny’s military fame. This growing global reputation started in September 1943 with 
Unternehmen Eiche and continued with Unternehmen Rösselsprung,5 which targeted the 
Yugoslav communist guerrillas fighting against Nazi rule in occupied Yugoslavia and 
their leader, Josip Broz Tito. In October 1944, Unternehmen Panzerfaust was conducted 
in Budapest to keep Hungary on the Axis side of the war and had a deep impact on 
German political and military strategy. Most renowned in the United States were, and 
still are, Unternehmen Greif6 in December 1944, when Skorzeny’s men conducted a 
false-flag operation during so called Battle of the Bulge or the Ardennenoffensive and the 
planned Nazi underground resistance movement in post war Germany–the Werwolf SS.7  
Also, the rumored Unternehmen Weitsprung8 to kill Stalin, Roosevelt, and 
Churchill during the Teheran Conference in 1943 built Skorzeny’s popularity. All these 
operations are still connected to the man named Skorzeny and supposedly illustrate his 
cleverness, tactical knowledge, and courage.9 
                                                 
5 Operation Knight’s Leap. 
6 Operation Griffin. 
7 Charles Foley, Commando Extraordinary: Otto Skorzeny (New York: Putnam, 1955); Glenn B. 
Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando (New York: Military Heritage, 1988). 
8 Operation Long Jump. 
9 Whiting, Skorzeny; Gordon Williamson, German Special Forces of World War II (Oxford: 
Bloomsbury, 2012). 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Especially in the English language literature, but in Germany and Austria as well, 
contemporary authors still rely mostly on Skorzeny’s autobiographical works and 
personal accounts about special operations during World War II. Even today, he is a 
household name in the successful conduct of special operations. His influence has been 
pervasive. For example, his idea of a German resistance movement called Werwolf after 
the German defeat has even been said to have influenced terroristic organizations like Al 
Qaida and the Islamic State and their irregular tactics.10 
While Unternehmen Eiche was crucial for Germany’s war strategy and for 
Skorzeny’s career, this operation is also the first high-value target special operation in 
modern times and is used as the perfect case study to teach soldiers and military leaders 
how to conduct a successful operation.11 Skorzeny is described as the one who received 
the order to rescue Mussolini personally from Adolf Hitler, planned the whole operation, 
conducted reconnaissance on his own, and led his men with the support of German 
paratroopers to operational success with large strategic gains. Awards and honors in the 
aftermath supposedly confirmed his lead responsibility.12 On the other hand, there is 
some increasing doubt since the 1980s in the United States about his involvement in this 
operation that follow the doubts that first arose in Germany and Europe much earlier in 
those skeptical of his fame at the time. Paratroopers claimed the honor for conducting 
Unternehmen Eiche soon after. But criticism of Skorzeny was suppressed and therefore, 
he was officially still the operational hero.13 
                                                 
10 James Carlini, “Otto Skorzeny: The Nazi who Influenced ISIS,” International Policy Digest, July 
18, 2016: https://intpolicydigest.org/2016/07/18/otto-skorzeny-the-nazi-who-influenced-isis/ (accessed 
December 4, 2017). 
11 William H. McRaven, “The Theory of Special Operations,” Master’s thesis 1993, Naval 
Postgraduate School: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/14838. 
12 McRaven, Special Operations, 251–309; Greg Annussek, Hitler’s Raid to Save Mussolini: The 
Most Infamous Commando Operation of World War II (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2005); 
Foley, Commando Extraordinary; Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando; Whiting, The Most Dangerous 
Man; Williamson, German Special Forces. 
13 Vincenzo Di Michele, The Last Secret of Mussolini (Rimini: Il Cerchio, 2015); Roger Edwards, 
German Airborne Troops (New York: Doubleday, 1974); Romano Mussolini, My father, il Duce (Carlsbad, 
CA: Kales Press, 2006); Kurt Student, Generaloberst Student und seine Fallschirmjäger, ed. Hermann 
Götzel (Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1980). 
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Similar doubts can be raised about Unternehmen Panzerfaust. Although this 
operation is less documented and analyzed, its impact on German warfighting was 
important. Authors who describe this special operation are again influenced by Otto 
Skorzeny’s own accounts. Repeatedly, planning and successful execution are described 
as being ordered by Skorzeny. Reportedly tasked by Adolf Hitler, he went in civilian 
clothes to Budapest and took the Hungarian regent’s son hostage, attacking the palace 
and pressuring the Regent Horthy to resign as head of state.14 
As already described in reference to Unternehmen Eiche, most U.S. military 
historians and writers honoring Otto Skorzeny base their work on his autobiography, 
personal accounts, and his awards and honors in the aftermath of these operations. Again, 
his military genius on a tactical special operations level is highlighted by articles and 
book chapters for studying (military) students.15 
There is a difference between U.S. authors and German and European writers, the 
latter two who are more critical about the role that Skorzeny played in the conduct of 
these special operations. These German authors argue diplomatic negotiations had a 
bigger impact on the ongoing Wehrmacht operation to occupy Hungary, which seemed to 
be more effective in influencing Horthy’s decision to resign and let Ferenc Szálasi 
became dictator of a pro-Nazi governed Hungary.16 These critiques do not deny that 
Skorzeny was there and did take action that contributed to the outcome. 
After reviewing current authors who write about these two Skorzeny-led 
operations, I want to focus on a third concern about Skorzeny’s legacy, which also is 
used by different authors in various ways. World War II and its military operations have 
primary sources available in a size that fill archives of the ex-combatant nations. Official 
documents, official reports, and memoirs of people at that time describe events, 
                                                 
14 Johann Hindert, “German Views of Irregular Warfare,” Master’s thesis 2015, Naval Postgraduate 
School: https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45873; Hans Georg Lehmann, “Unternehmen Panzerfaust, 
Der Putsch der SS in Budapest am 15. Oktober 1944,” Ungarn-Jahrbuch, Zeitschrift für die Kunde 
Ungarns und verwandte Gebiete, 5 (1973): 215–231. 
15 Hindert, “German Views.” 
16 Lehmann, Unternehmen Panzerfaust, 227. 
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relationships, and connections.17 A distinction should thus be made between the record of 
the war as visible in such documents and the autobiographical iteration of conflict and 
fighting that quickly emerged in the war’s wake and for which a major market existed 
well beyond Germany, to say nothing of the interests of the defeated to shine a positive 
light on what often had been criminal behavior or an enterprise that had ended in 
catastrophic defeat.   
It is remarkable to write in 2017 that Otto Skorzeny’s autobiography has been 
used and cited by nearly every author writing about him.18 But there are just a few writers 
who doubt Skorzeny’s descriptions and crosscheck his accounts.19 Memoirs, interviews, 
and film clips of those participants or otherwise involved persons in Skorzeny’s special 
operations are rarely used and cited. Again, there is a difference between U.S. authors 
and German and European writers, because the memoirs and interviews of, for instance, 
the paratrooper General Kurt Student, Harald Mors, Benito Mussolini’s son, or Miklós 
Horthy are only used by the latter two. Even available official documents and reports, 
which contradict and challenge Skorzeny’s accounts about Budapest, are only cited in a 
single German article.20 Interestingly, Düsterberg writes about a special type of postwar 
literature, which follows on the one hand the descriptive narrative of National Socialist 
propaganda and on the other hand satisfied the German veteran needs of a German 
crimeless free fought war.21 Therefore, mostly former-high-ranking senior officers as 
authors used a mixture of autobiographical contents and fictional adventurous narrative.22 
                                                 
17 Heinz Bliss (ed.), “Das Fallschirmjäger-Lehr-Regiment” (Witzenhausen: FeldmannDruck, 1999); 
Martin Moll (ed.), “Führer-Erlasse” 1939–1945 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997); Nicholas Horthy, A 
Life for Hungary, Memoirs (Bronx, NY: Ishi Press International, 2011); Mussolini, My Father; Radl, Aide, 
1981; Rudolf Rahn, Ruheloses Leben: Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen eines deutschen Diplomaten 
(Düsseldorf: Diederichs Verlag, 1949); Student, Generaloberst Student. 
18 Annussek, Hitler’s Raid; Foley, Commando Extraordinary; Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando; 
Whiting, The Most Dangerous Man; Hindert, German views; McRaven, Special Operations. 
19 Rolf Düsterberg, Soldat und Kriegserlebnis: Deutsche militärische Erinnerungskultur (1945-1961) 
zum Zweiten Weltkrieg; Motive, Begriffe, Wertungen (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2000); Lehmann, Unternehmen 
Panzerfaust. 
20 Lehmann, Unternehmen Panzerfaust. 
21 Düsterberg, Soldat und Kriegserlebnis, 51, 54–72. 
22 Düsterberg, Soldat und Kriegserlebnis, 62–67. 
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Otto Skorzeny’s books are seen in this type of postwar literature and follow these lines of 
satisfying German postwar veteran readers. 
D. APPROACH 
In order to better understand the circumstances surrounding these two special 
operations, the thesis will start by providing the strategic environment during the conduct 
of these two German missions. It will focus on the German, Italian, and Hungarian 
perspectives individually to explain what led to changes inside the countries and during 
the war, which influenced Germany to plan and conduct special operations during these 
phases of World War II. 
With the purpose to answer the question of what Otto Skorzeny’s real role in 
German World War II special operations was, a chapter of this thesis will focus on 
critiques about Skorzeny’s narrative of his involvement in German special operations. 
This thesis will rely on the critical comparison of primary sources. This literature will be 
mostly German, but the thesis will also use Skorzeny’s interview as a prisoner of war 
after his capture by American soldiers in 1945. Autobiographies, biographies of German 
and foreign military and government personnel involved in special operations, and 
official German government and military documents will be crucial to this undertaking 
when levied against a more or less uncritical English-language literature, which suffers 
from a lack of detail and especially lack of context. The validation of literature in its 
description of Skorzeny’s role will be based on a comparison of Skorzeny’s 
autobiography My Commando Operations to other sources. This research aspires to 
identify those parts of the narrative that are contested by more than one other participant. 
Official documents will be rare for this thesis but as far as they are available through the 
German Bundesarchiv,23 they will be used for answering the research question. 
Secondary sources like regimental history, books about Skorzeny himself, and 
articles about German special operations will help to reconstruct these German special 
operations and Skorzeny’s role, if primary sources will not provide the needed 
information for this thesis. 
                                                 
23 Federal Archive of Germany . 
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The limitation of this literature is based on its availability. Many official German 
documents are still unavailable because of their classification, which was determined 
during or after the war by Allied forces or governments, or because they were burned 
during the defeat of Germany. Also witnesses or members of the conducted operations 
are no longer available, since it is already 70 years since the war’s end. Their accounts 
are mostly lost, if they were not written down and/or published in the time immediately 
after the war. 
On the following pages, this thesis will concentrate on two German special 
operations, which were both successful, had a major impact on the ongoing war, and 
contributed to and augmented Otto Skorzeny’s fame. The first case will be Unternehmen 
Eiche in 1943, the rescue operation of Italy’s dictator Mussolini, and the beginning of 
Skorzeny’s fame. This special operation is still today used as a model case study to teach 
young officers how to conduct successful operations and illustrated how closely 
connected Skorzeny’s name is to this operation. The second case, Unternehmen 
Panzerfaust in 1944, was again a high-value target special operation because the 
Hungarian Regent Horthy had to be caught to keep Hungary on the Axis side of the war 
to fight against the Soviet Union. This thesis will use these two examples to describe the 
missions and ascertain Skorzeny’s actual role in special operations. 
By concentrating on just two German special operations, this may create an 
incomplete picture and characterization of Skorzeny than if the thesis reviewed all of 
Skorzeny’s special operations. Further academic work may describe his role in the other 
operations. This ongoing work would provide a better characterization, but two 
successfully conducted German special operations and analysis of Otto Skorzeny’s 
involvement can at least suggest a more realistic and less legend-based account of his role 
in those operations. 
In this thesis, both operations will be divided into different phases: origin, 
planning, execution, and aftermath. By using this scheme, the reader will easily be able to 
trace Skorzeny’s impact and influence in order to form a more accurate picture of his 
participation and the operations as a whole. Distinguishing both special operations is the 
most logical way to achieve these goals. 
 9
After the analysis of the two historical case studies, a following chapter 
concentrates on Skorzeny’s strategic value. It will describe how Skorzeny achieved 
strategic impact for Germany on its domestic population, internal SS volunteer recruiting, 
WWII politics and military, and on Germany’s adversaries and their warfighting. 
Furthermore, according to the findings in the Critical Analysis chapter, a chapter 
will provide accurate accounts of how Unternehmen Eiche and Unternehmen Panzerfaust 
were conducted. Primary sources concerning the conduct of these operations will be 
compared and cross-referenced with Skorzeny’s personally-produced narrative in order to 
gain a clearer and more realistic account.  
The conclusion will summarize the findings of his involvement and similarities in 
both cases and will show the real role Skorzeny played in the different phases of German 
special operations, which will further enhance the readers understanding of Otto 
Skorzeny’s real contributions to the conduct of special operations. The summary also has 
to differentiate between the different phases of special operations because the findings 
lead to various contributions and end states during these different phases. When 
compared, discrepancies paint a more accurate picture of Otto Skorzeny’s real 
contributions. 
 10
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II. STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
A. GENERAL 
Both special operations took part in a crucial environment of Germany’s 
warfighting situation in which the Reich and its Axis allies suffered ever more under the 
blows of the allied offensive. Skorzeny claims Unternehmen Eiche and Unternehmen 
Panzerfaust as his independently planned and executed missions,24 which saved 
Germany’s military from defeat prior to May 8, 1945. The following sections of this 
thesis will describe the political and military environment of the successfully conducted 
German special operations, while Chapter IV will focus on the strategic value and the 
result of Skorzeny’s missions.  
B. UNTERNEHMEN EICHE 
Since 1943, the Italian popular support for the Italian military fighting on the 
German side against Allied Forces was decreasing in the face of the Allied offensive, first 
in North Africa, and then in Sicily. The defeat in Tunisia in May 1943 and the Allied 
bombing raids against Italian cities forced the Italian population and elites to oppose 
Germany and Axis strategic goals.25 During Operation Husky, Allied Forces started their 
invasions on smaller islands ahead of Sicily on June 11, 1943 and attacked Sicily on July 
10, 1943.26 Allied amphibious operations and airborne operations supported the landing 
on Sicily, while German and Italian troops withdrew up until August 17, 1943.27 As a 
result of the Allied landing on Sicily, the Grand Council of Fascism revolted against Il 
Duce and abolished the power of Mussolini, which they transferred mostly to the Italian 
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King, Victor Emmanuel III. The king informed Mussolini about his decision to form a 
new government under the head of Pietro Badoglio, who was the former Chief of Italian 
High Command.28 The Italian paramilitary police, the Carabinieri, imprisoned 
Mussolini.29 King Emmanuel III did not want to continue the war with Germany against 
the Allied Forces, and therefore, Pietro Badoglio contacted the Allied Forces to negotiate 
a ceasefire and to surrender.30  
The leadership of the German military feared that the Italian surrender would 
facilitate the Allied attack to the North, which would threaten the German homeland.31 
The Italian ceasefire at the beginning of September 1943 manifested this German fear, 
and German troops began forcibly to demilitarize Italian units.32 
In this political and military environment, Germany launched Unternehmen Eiche 
on September 12, 1943. 
C. UNTERNEHMEN PANZERFAUST 
For Hungary, as for Germany, the final destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad 
in early 1943, and the following battles, altered perceptions and opinions about the war 
and the probability of victory.33 The Hungarian Regent, Miklòs Horthy, was looking for 
opportunities to end the war. Since August 1943, the Hungarian government had been in 
contact with Allied Forces in attempt to become aligned with them.34 German 
intelligence noticed Hungary’s negotiations, but until Italy’s attempt to surrender, nothing 
happened.35 Since the end of 1943, the German military planned the Unternehmen 
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Margarethe,36 which aimed to occupy Hungary and avoid a situation similar to what 
happened in Italy.37 In Spring 1943, the German military completed mission planning, 
and Adolf Hitler authorized Unternehmen Margarethe to be launched on March 19, 
1944.38 Eight German Divisions occupied Hungary, and Germany led a new installed 
government under Prime Minister Döme Sztójay.39 At this point, a large part of the 
Hungarian population already supported communist movements and conducted irregular 
warfare against the German authorities.40 
In August 1944, the Red Army reached Romania, which surrendered, switched 
sides, and declared war on Germany.41 The Hungarian Regent Horthy recognized the 
disadvantage of the Axis’ situation and tried to negotiate his country’s surrender with the 
Soviets.42 Deserting and dissenting Hungarian soldiers had already been fighting in large 
numbers on side of the Red Army, while German and regular Hungarian troops prepared 
defense positions to stop the Soviet attacks.43 
D. CONCLUSION 
During crucial phases in the war, the German military conducted Unternehmen 
Eiche and Unternehmen Panzerfaust in a sensitive strategic environment of the collapse 
of the Axis flanks in the South and the East, a mortal danger to German domination of the 
continent. Up until these special operations, German troops and Axis powers had been 
fighting the Allies and the Red Army. A major loss of Germany’s allies’ support would 
have had severe consequences: loss of those countries’ manpower, support services, and 
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bureaucratic cooperation that provided internal security for the German forces. All of 
these factors would have resulted in significant loss of German forces, if they were cut 




The record of German soldiers in World War II is a rich and complex one and 
forms part of world history in an astonishing way. Books, films, and the propaganda of 
the time are omnipresent in the public mind. Noteworthy, however, amid the renaissance 
of writing about war and soldiers in Germany itself, has been the singular trend in 
historiography to examine the postwar careers of notable German soldiers and 
particularly their currying of fame and notoriety in the immediate post war years.44 In this 
connection, the story of the Austrian SS-leader, Otto Skorzeny, stands out as ripe for the 
kind of reinterpretation that has lately characterized a rich scholarship on those wartime 
personalities who stood out in the headlines in wartime and thereafter.  
This analysis of the biography and operational deeds of Skorzeny in fact and 
legend as well as his conduct of special operations will be divided into three parts. The 
first part concentrates on general analysis about Skorzeny’s involvement and credibility 
in the two special missions this thesis concentrates: the Mussolini Gran Sasso event in 
1943 and the seizure of the Hungarian Head of State Horthy in 1944. 
The second part will focus on Unternehmen Eiche and criticism about Skorzeny 
during this special operation to rescue the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini at Gran Sasso. 
The third Skorzeny critique will be about Unternehmen Panzerfaust, which targeted the 
Hungarian Regent Admiral Miklós Horthy in Budapest. All three case studies will allow 
the reader to develop a clear view of Otto Skorzeny’s real role in those two famous cases 
renowned in legend and its value for conducting these special operations as an analysis of 
the past as it has implications for the present and those who must act in the face of 
danger.   
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A. GENERAL 
This section provides general criticism about Skorzeny’s involvement and 
conduct of the two special operations on which this thesis focuses on. The following 
critiques have value for both case studies, but may be also used for further research on 
Skorzeny’s special operation because of some overall criticism about Skorzeny’s ability 
to conduct special operations. This question has merit for the author, as a special 
operations veteran and scholar, but also for scholarship in a general sense associated with 
the story of the Wehrmacht and the SS in the 20th century and even beyond. This section 
will suggest, that there are reasonable doubts, which will lead to the assumption that Otto 
Skorzeny might not have conducted the two special missions Unternehmen Eiche and 
Unternehmen Panzerfaust precisely in the way he described it in the decades after the 
war to all who would eagerly listen to this startling figure. I suggest at the outset that the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, beset as it was by SS-men oriented to the West, and 
less friendly SS men oriented to Moscow, who did not trust Skorzeny overall. Most 
important, and a fact that becomes lost in the celebration of military feats of the armed 
SS, when compared to the military competency of NATO officers in the 21st century, 
Skorzeny did not have much military knowledge about tactical or operational use of 
military units. Indeed, he belonged to the SS Sicherheitsdienst and not the small number 
of Waffen-SS figures who had enjoyed some degree of military training and education at 
higher echelons of command, if at all, and such men were very few indeed. The SD45 was 
yet again the party intelligence organization that had morphed one of the security policy 
entities in the Third Reich and occupied Europe, which as an organization did not train 
and facilitate its officer corps with command of tactical echelons for combat operations. 
Reinhard Heydrich himself was a failed naval officer, cashiered for ethics infractions, 
who was prone to gather educated men around him in the SD, but these tended to be 
lawyers and racial ethnologists as opposed to trained company or field grade officers. The 
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SD was an internal security organization intended for espionage, totalitarian control, and, 
once conquest began, for the realization by secret police and state terror means the 
control of subject populations.  
After World War II, American soldiers captured Otto Skorzeny and interrogated 
him at Dachau which became a U.S. barracks, a prison, and the site of war crimes trials.46 
Later on, once Skorzeny escaped to Franco’s Spain, the newly formed CIA, which grew 
out of the OSS, observed him and documented their observations.47 These CIA 
documents will show, that the U.S. was well informed about Skorzeny, not just after 
World War II, but also before.48 Skorzeny is described as “not particularly gifted with 
administrative or executive talents,”49 he is recognized as being overvalued by his own 
importance,50 the CIA knew that he was seen as an “upstart”51 by German (staff-)officers 
and comrades, that Otto Skorzeny was not as intelligent as he stated himself52 and that he 
is “child-like in many ways”53 according to a CIA source. All these descriptions do not 
fit into the picture of Otto Skorzeny originally drawn by Nationalist Socialist-propaganda 
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or later by himself to his credulous public. Because of this fact, unlike other SS men who 
might have been useful in the incipient Cold War and the requirement to fight the 
Soviets, the CIA was never interested in working with Skorzeny.54 He still never had 
skills, which would be useful, although he was part of the most recognized special 
operations during World War II. 
Originally a member of the illegal Vienna-SS,55 known for its terror activities in 
the illegal period of the NSDAP, SA, and SS after 1933 and prior to 1938, once the 
Anschluss56 took hold, Otto Skorzeny’s military career began in 1939 when he tried to 
join the Luftwaffe.57 He then got transferred to the Waffen-SS, because he was not 
qualified to become a pilot. During his military career, he received no or only minor 
tactical and operational military education in the classical sense of those who customarily 
lead troops in combat at higher echelons of command.58 Therefore, he was never capable 
of understanding and directing troops in a traditional military sense and was even by his 
further Chief of Staff, Wilhelm Walther never seen by those who were the graduates of 
such training and education as being an “officer.”59 Skorzeny himself described his 
training as that of a Technischer Offizier60 in his books and his basic training at the 
Waffen-SS.61 But, there is no further classical education or training mentioned for 
command at the tactical or operational level as enjoyed by certain Waffen-SS officers in 
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their small numbers, who were indeed party to traditional army professional military 
education,62 which might has develop or increase his tactical, operational, and strategic 
capacity in his military biography. Minor trainings on mostly technical issues 
characterized his time as battalion commander of z.b.V. Friedenthal.63 Thus, conducting 
military operations without much understanding of tactics, especially if it is about special 
operations with specialized units, having special equipment and operating on difficult 
circumstances, is nearly impossible. This missing military, tactical, operational 
knowledge also was not developed over time as Unternehmen Greif64  from December 16 
to December 28, 1944 showed and is perceived by historians.65 Also, his daughter 
Waltraut Riess described her father Otto Skorzeny as being mostly interested in technical 
issues, as would befit an engineering student, and being a “Haudegen und Draufgänger”66 
but not being an intellectual in the classical sense of the educated German officer.67 
Therefore, again, also his studies during the war might be mostly directed into 
technological development and not into the use of special tactical operational art to fight 
against Germany’s adversaries.68  
Into this also comes Skorzeny’s military position until he became commander of 
the battalion z.b.V. Friedenthal. He was a Technischer Offizier that is to say, combat 
service support, in several armed SS-Divisions,69 so that even until 1943, he never 
garnered experience for tactical leadership of soldiers in combat. It is also interesting 
that, although the divisions in which he served were involved in campaigns in France and 
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Russia, he never was especially recognized as being heroic, outstanding, or courageous in 
these actions.70 This fact is also a reason why Otto Skorzeny was not decorated and 
honored until 1943. 
The transfer of Otto Skorzeny in 1943 from the Waffen-SS to z.b.V. Friedenthal is 
only understandable if the reason for this special unit is clear. This battalion was created 
for the special purpose of conducting Unternehmen Zeppelin,71 which targeted the Soviet 
Union.72 This operation was conducted by Amt VI des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes73 and 
its aim was to gather information about the Soviet population and economy, to sabotage 
crucial infrastructure, conduct assassinations, and to lead revolts against the Soviets.74 
One should also note that the command entities that guided war in the east and managed 
German and Axis policy in the conquered eastern territories constituted a “whole of 
government” in Nazi Germany that beggars the mind of a contemporary observer with its 
crossed purposes and overlapping lines of command and control. Skorzeny’s role is part 
of this highly conflicted instrument of power which beggars the mind of someone 
familiar with security sector organization in the 21st century.  
One might even compare this SS/RSHA campaign somewhat with the personalities 
and tactics of what today is called hybrid war. But the take-away here is manifestly this 
undertaking was but poorly coordinated with traditional military channels of command 
and was not a military operation in its classical sense, but still a strategic special 
operation. But, already at the beginning of this operation the responsible SS-
Sturmbannführer, Dr. Heinz Gräfe, mentioned that this operation may only cause minor 
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nuisance, because of the minor reliability of agents, who were found at prisoner of war 
camps.75 Himmler wanted to use this situation for his own purpose to make the SS more 
important and bolster his influence, because of the lack of Wehrmacht capabilities to 
conduct this operation.76 By the beginning of 1943, the results of Unternehmen Zeppelin 
were getting worse, so that the whole concept had to be rethought.77 The need for men, 
who were able to operate with radios and operate behind enemy lines was highlighted, 
and thus the special battalion z.b.V Friedenthal was created.78 This explains why SS-
Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny got the position of the commanding officer. It was not, 
because he was recognized as a man with great ideas and a heroic military background, 
but because of his technical studies before the war, his position of an engineering officer, 
and his membership to the SS. Skorzeny described his position of being solely 
commanded by the Reichsführung SS and RSHA,79 but this is not true. According to the 
personnel synthesis, which was created by the headquarters of z.b.V. Friedenthal, the new 
Gruppe VI S, the members of this group were members of the RSHA, the Waffen-SS, the 
Wehrmacht, and volunteering Hilfswillige,80 which the SD commanded.81 The purpose of 
this special unit was to conduct special intelligence operations parallel to regular military 
(Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS) operations with the main effort of using high technological, 
specialized equipment as long-range radios and special weapons for their agency work. 
According to Skorzeny’s narrative, that members of the SD had to wear the SD-rhombus  
or police branch color insignia on their uniform, but he did not, because he was member  
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of the Waffen-SS82 and can be also explained by the aforementioned, peculiar personnel 
structure of z.b.V. Friedenthal. But this did not alter the leading command function of the 
SD like Skorzeny wanted to claim. 
For all of Skorzeny’s special missions, the wartime media’s propaganda played a 
fateful role in the creation of his personal myth at the time and thereafter. Through 
German media, Otto Skorzeny not only became famous in Germany, but also in the 
United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and all other of Germany’s 
enemy countries. This fact endured well after the guns fell silent in 1945, granted the 
remarkable manner that wartime propaganda proved able to outlive its origins. But at that 
point German media was not just a single voice because next to the political influenced 
civil media, like the NSDAP newspaper Völkischer Beobachter or the documentary-like 
news program Deutsche Wochenschau, all military branches had their own news 
magazines as well as films and radio to inform their own troops and the German 
population about their battles, victories, and heroes. Most fateful, however, such 
propaganda of German arms also had the overwhelming strategic goal to increase 
recruitment of volunteers to serve in especially the SS-branch, which until 1942, had been 
based on such volunteers and not conscription, granted the reputation of the SS as the 
party elite-a thing in theory that always crashed with reality that too few persons really 
existed to fulfill this racial fantasy. The whole German propaganda machine was 
orchestrated by Reichspropagandaminister83 Joseph Goebbels, who controlled German 
media and directed it based on Adolf Hitler and his political goals.  
Although the SS had become a star of the German media in the early 1930s from 
its obscure origins, interestingly articles which claimed members of the SS as elite and 
idol increased in 1943.84 The increase of articles about the SS in Nazi media was not just 
because of Unternehmen Eiche in 1943, but also because of the epic battle of Charkov in 
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March 1943 and Adolf Hitler’s desire to present this victory in German media in the 
wake of the Stalingrad defeat and the slow German shift to the defensive on the eastern 
front.85 In addition to this increase of media presence, the SS had since the autumn of 
1942 suffered from a lack of volunteers and started to present itself in media more than 
before and commenced a media campaign.86 The prolonged war and the German and 
Axis people should never forget the glories of the Waffen-SS as being the army of 
National Socialism.87 To overcome this lack of volunteers and encourage recruitment of 
young men into this military branch, such members of the SS as Otto Skorzeny, Kurt 
Meyer, and Theodor Eicke became the embodiment of the soldierly ideal in the SS at 
arms and the media gave special attention to them.88 But not only SS internal goals gave a 
special opportunity to Otto Skorzeny for being represented in NS media. Parallel to 
Himmler’s need for volunteers, the Waffen-SS was a political model of NS ideology and 
its concept of a racially superior warrior society composed of heroes.89 Otto Skorzeny fit 
perfectly into the role of an ideal Nazi man and new model soldier, who still believed into 
Germany’s ability to win the war and stood for NS-ideology, since he became a member 
of the NSDAPin the early 1930’s in the so called Ostmark,90  i.e. Austria and specifically 
Vienna, where as much as Munich was the birthplace of national socialism.  
Also, the general trend in the high command for more military decoration and 
promotion was increasing since the end of 1942 as the military transitioned away from 
the estate-based army of former times to what was in fact a Nazi people’s army with the 
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heroification of men and women of simple social background like Hitler himself.91 
Additionally, the year 1943, i.e., when Goebbels proclaimed a total war effort after the 
Stalingrad defeat and the Allied called for Germany’s “unconditional surrender,” was a 
particular challenge for German political leaders and NS-propaganda, because of the 
defeat by Soviet troops on the eastern front and the coup against Mussolini in Italy. 
Granted Nazi ideology, which relied on martyrdom and heroic deeds as the core of its 
idea, the German population needed heroes, who still believed in Adolf Hitler and 
ultimate German victory.92 Joseph Goebbels himself wanted to press the Waffen-SS for 
more propaganda since 1942 and since 1943 to present a more realistic picture of Waffen-
SS soldiers.93 Interestingly, Lehnhardt states in his article about Waffen-SS in NS-
propaganda, that the image of the SS, developed and produced by the SS and NS-media 
did not just influence the citizens of the Third Reich, but, fatefully enough, this heroic 
image of the Waffen-SS has endured for decades in current mainly Western media.94 This 
generalization, which has major implications for Skorzeny’s biography and military 
reputation, will be supported by focusing on Unternehmen Eiche. 
To summarize the findings of this general critique, it has been shown that the CIA 
did not take Otto Skorzeny seriously and that he was not an officer with military 
leadership skills, and rather was obsessed by technological development. The battalion 
z.b.V. Friedenthal was more an intelligence agency than a kind of Special Operation 
Forces and was led by the SD. The NS- and SS-propaganda had a need for heroes 
presented to the population and to the German opponents latest since beginning of 1943 
and the fall of Stalingrad, which gave Otto Skorzeny advantage of being recognized in 
media in the way he was and still is (within English-speaking countries). 
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B. UNTERNEHMEN EICHE 
Critique of Unternehmen Eiche will completely focus on this single case, 
although issues, which were already described by the first section “General” will be also 
used for this case, because of its interconnection with this special operation to rescue 
Benito Mussolini. Unavailability of documents concerning this operation limits the 
expanse of this section. As of yet, no reliable official sources have been discovered. 
Therefore, this thesis will rely on primary, personal sources like Hauptsturmführer95 Otto 
Skorzeny’s narrative and the description of his adjutant Obersturmführer Karl Radl, an 
SD administrator, in comparison to biographies of Mussolini, the autobiography of 
General Kurt Student, and the narratives from Major Harald Mors, Hauptmann Heinrich 
Gerlach, and Unteroffizier Harry Mertin.  
The findings of this section will argue that Otto Skorzeny did not conduct 
Unternehmen Eiche exactly the way he described the operation in his books.96 The unit 
under Skorzeny’s command was not capable of planning an operation with gliders in 
rough terrain like Gran Sasso because of their lack of experience and knowledge. 
Furthermore, members of z.b.V. Friedenthal were not trained and equipped for being an 
assault element, while Skorzeny had no leading function over the involved 
Fallschirmjäger-Lehr-Regiment or other units. Skorzeny and his men were even not 
prepared for their participation in the operation as photos show and NS-propaganda used 
Skorzeny for its purpose to show German military strength and German ideals to the 
population and German adversaries, while a differentiating reporting about Gran Sasso 
was denied by Joseph Goebbels. 
Interestingly, the CIA had early knowledge, in the postwar period, about the real 
conduct of Unternehmen Eiche and the created narrative of Otto Skorzeny.97 This thesis 
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will provide more evidence than just a sole CIA document, which will be shown by the 
following. 
At the beginning, it has to be stated, that Skorzeny and his men were surely 
involved into the search and locating of Mussolini. Kurt Student’s narrative is plausible. 
According to it, Student needed support to locate Mussolini after he received the task 
from Adolf Hitler to liberate and bring Mussolini to Germany.98 That would completely 
fit into the intelligence role of Skorzeny’s z.b.V. Friedenthal and therefore it is also 
obvious that Adolf Hitler chose Skorzeny to support Student’s task.99 Even Karl Radl’s 
narrative supports this, when he mentioned that Skorzeny and Mors were both under 
Student’s command, but not in command of one over the other.100 
Before the media put Otto Skorzeny in the limelight, until 1943 the German 
Fallschirmjäger101 were famous for conducting special missions. Since 1937 German 
paratroopers were trained in their special skills and created as a unit, which was used for 
special missions like the assault on Eben Emael, the Battle of Rotterdam, the occupation 
of Narvik, the assault on the Corinth Canal, and even Unternehmen Merkur, the costly 
airborne invasion of Crete. For all these most successful operations these German 
paratrooper units trained hard and had a great cohesion within its units, battalions, 
regiments, and even divisions. In contrast, Skorzeny’s battalion z.b.V. Friedenthal was a 
young unit and created with the purpose of operating in small groups behind enemy lines 
in the Eastern war theater, to conduct reconnaissance, minor sabotage, and assassinations. 
Within less than 6 months it is doubtful that Skorzeny created out of this group of men 
from all branches and services a cohesive assault unit, experienced and skilled in the use 
of infantry tactics and able to conduct special/commando operations.102 Martin van 
Creveld describes intensively how important cohesion for military success during World 
War II was, but none of his argument about cohesion within military units could be find 
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at that stage within z.b.V. Friedenthal.103 Alone the assault with Lastensegler104 on a 
terrain as difficult as Gran Sasso required a lot of experience, which was not available 
amongst Skorzeny’s crew. Therefore, Skorzeny, who was not tactical trained and 
experienced, and his men were (highly unlikely able to plan or conduct independently an 
operation like Unternehmen Eiche.   
The Gran Sasso Raid itself is very well documented because of the Wehrmacht 
photographer Toni Schneider, who took pictures during the assault. These photos are 
available by the German Bundesarchiv and can be viewed online.105 The interesting part 
about these pictures and Skorzeny’s and Radl’s narrative is about the uniforms and 
combat equipment. Although Radl and Skorzeny describe that they got paratroop 
uniforms and equipment106 like the FG-42107 none of the pictures at Gran Sasso shows 
them. All men of Skorzeny’s group a clearly identified by wearing only Luftwaffe tropical 
uniforms, standard Wehrmacht helmets, and the German standard rifle K-98.108 All 
members of the Fallschirmjäger-Lehr-Regiment are wearing the regular paratroop 
combat uniform and helmet.109 These details show that Skorzeny’s and Radl’s narrative 
cannot be exactly true, because if Skorzeny was planning and preparing the conduct of 
the Mussolini’ liberation, his men would be prepared with their combat gear and airborne 
helmets. “Skorzeny claims that he smashed the radio [of the Italian guardsmen] with the 
butt of his sub-machine gun, but photographs from Gran Sasso indicate that he was 
                                                 
103 Martin L. Van Creveld, Kampfkraft: Militärische Organisation und Leistung 1939–1945 (Graz: 
Ares Verlag, 2005). 
104 Gliders (author). 
105 Tony Schneider, Photographs of Unternehmen Eiche (Freiburg: Bundesarchiv, 1943), 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Search&limit=500&offset=0&profile=default&
search=unternehmen+eiche&searchToken=50m07j27lbya008mtk5v2j4lt (accessed December 4, 2017). 
106 Radl, Kommando “Eiche,” 33, 35, 111. 
107 Radl, Kommando “Eiche,” 65. 
108 Tony Schneider, Photographs of Unternehmen Eiche, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_101I-567-1503C-
36,_Gran_Sasso,_Fallschirmjäger_und_Waffen-SS.jpg (accessed December 4, 2017); Lehnhardt, Die 
Waffen-SS, 460. 
109 Forczyk, Rescuing Mussolini, 31. 
 28
armed only with a Walther PPK pistol.”110 Thus, Skorzeny’s narrative may be false and 
leads to this determination because of the surely unpreparedness of Skorzeny’s men that 
they did not expected to be part of Unternehmen Eiche. 
Karl Radl and Otto Skorzeny describe in their narratives about finding Mussolini, 
how they were cooperating with other German troops.111 But it is never stated that these 
units became attached to Skorzeny. They were cooperating and supporting Skorzeny’s 
mission in a way that he and his troops informed the supported units with intelligence on 
Mussolini’s location. Those commanding officers supported by Skorzeny’s intelligence, 
used this information to lead their units and conduct the operation. These supporting and 
supported relationships cast doubt on Skorzeny’s and Radl’s descriptions about their 
contributions and roles in Unternehmen Eiche and the freeing of Mussolini. Although the 
Fallschirmjäger-Lehr-Regiment was never attached to Skorzeny and always under Harald 
Mors’ command,112 Skorzeny claims full responsibility for planning a mission with these 
Fallschirmjäger but never cites, when they became his subordinates.113 Skorzeny’s z.b.V. 
Friedenthal was operating according to its purpose in small groups. These groups 
cooperated and were supported by regular German units to fulfill their mission.114 Mors 
and Skorzeny were both attached to Kurt Student. Student tasked Skorzeny to find 
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This narrative, which comes close to Student’s,115 Mors’,116 Gerlach’s117 and Mertin’s118 
description of the Gran Sasso Raid.  
Tactically speaking, if Skorzeny would have been in lead of the assault company 
at Gran Sasso, he would not have been within the assault Gruppe capturing Mussolini, 
but supervising and leading his whole company, like the real commanding officer 
Freiherr von Berlepsch did.119 There are also doubts, that Skorzeny influenced his glider 
pilots to change their position and Student’s explanation of misunderstanding, which is 
also described by Mors, are more plausible.120 
Being one of the first men inside the hotel leads to another false narrative from 
Skorzeny. “In his postwar interrogation about the raid, Skorzeny claimed that SS-
Oberscharführer Walther Gläsner and Sfaeller assisted in securing the room, but in his 
memoirs he claims it was Holzer. In his account, Holzer said the other SS man was 
Neitzel.”121 
All mentioned aspects offer evidence, that Skorzeny’s narrative and his conduct 
of Unternehmen Eiche may be exaggerated. But, NS-propaganda made him to the 
recognizable commando and therefore, this section will also focus on the presentation of 
Unternehmen Eiche. The propaganda about Skorzeny was not preplanned, but fitted 
perfectly into the narrative, which was needed at the time.122 The existing German 
military capability to conduct these types of operations and the still existing bravery 
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should be shown to German citizens and Germany’s opponents.123 Also, the SS-member, 
Otto Skorzeny was depicted and still perceived as the ideal German soldier, who fights 
although circumstances may be difficult.124 Goebbels himself stated in his diary, that he 
wanted to eradicate varying narratives about Mussolini’s liberation, a decision that 
continues to influence how many perceive Otto Skorzeny’s role during Unternehmen 
Eiche.125 
These details reveal that Skorzeny was unable to plan and conduct a mission with 
special paratrooper equipment like gliders at Gran Sasso because of his lack of 
experience and knowledge about these issues. Furthermore, his men were also incapable 
of conducting this mission alone. Skorzeny never commanded an engaged unit in Italy 
except z.b.V. Friedenthal, but cooperated and supported with those, which were tasked. 
Nevertheless, he was there at Gran Sasso and did play a role in the bloodless rescue of 
Mussolini and therefore, Skorzeny was used strategically by NS-propaganda to 
demonstrate German military strength and to inspire the German peoples’ belief in their 
nation’s victory.  
C. UNTERNEHMEN PANZERFAUST 
Many military historians classify Unternehmen Panzerfaust as two separate 
operations with which Skorzeny was involved. One mission was the capture of Niklas 
Horthy Jr., the Hungarian regent’s son and the “real” Unternehmen Panzerfaust, which is 
the occupation of the Hungarian regent’s palace in Budapest. Although Unternehmen 
Panzerfaust is just about the Miklós Horthy palace, this thesis will focus on both 
missions, because of Skorzeny’s involvement. 
This thesis will rely on primary sources like Hauptsturmführer,126 Otto 
Skorzeny’s narrative, and use biographies and the autobiography of Miklós Horthy, 
Rudolf Rahn, the narratives from regimental history of the SS_Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 
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600 and a letter from the Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer in Ungarn Otto Winkelmann to 
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler to provide comparative analysis of the recorded 
accounts.  
The findings of this section will argue that Skorzeny was not involved in the 
capture of Hothy’s son and played a supporting role in occupying Horthy’s palace, while 
the Hungarian regent had already resigned.  
Skorzeny describes the beginning of Unternehmen Panzerfaust with being tasked 
by Adolf Hitler for the conduct of this operation.127 Interestingly, the Höhere SS- und 
Polizeiführer in Ungarn, Otto Winkelmann, did receive the same task, because he reports 
to his commander Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler on October 25, 1944.128 Thus, 
Skorzeny could not be the only person who knew about this special mission. 
In the beginning of October, Winkelmann’s policemen captured the Hungarian 
regent’s son, Niklas Horthy, while Skorzeny’s men were provided security for the SS 
police operation.129 If Skorzeny’s men were really needed and got tasked by 
Winkelmann, like he describes, is in doubt because Winkelmann did not mention this 
claimed request for support, and in Skorzeny’s narrative, he and his men were in civilian 
clothes and did not have any other weapons other than their pistols that they used in a 
small firefight . Additionally, Skorzeny’s men were not at the place where the capture of 
Horthy Jr. happened.130 Skorzeny’s narrative describes solely the situation in front of the 
house, where Horthy Jr. was captured, while Winkelmann only mentioned Skorzeny at 
the airport, where Skorzeny tasked a Hungarian unit to lie on the ground, while Horthy Jr. 
was put into an aircraft and small arms fire had begun.131 
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The second part and the real Unternehmen Panzerfaust, Skorzeny claims that 
he alone planned and conducted the operation independently.132 But Winkelmann 
gave a different report to Himmler, and he would have been judged for lying to the 
Reichsführer SS.   
The SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, who Skorzeny 
mentions disparagingly133 was the commanding officer in Budapest at that time and came 
recently from Warsaw, where he commanded the defeat of a revolt.134 Winkelmann 
stated that SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski the commanding officer was 
and that SS-Standartenführer Zehender was in leading function for the troops. It is 
questionable, that Skorzeny being a SS-Sturmbannführer took over command and led the 
troops. This would have been surely reported to Himmler. 
It might more plausible that Skorzeny’s unit SS-Jäger-Bataillon 502, an infantry 
unit, had to support the whole operation. That explains why he was not mentioned by 
Winkelmann. The SS-Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 600 was the assault company, which 
penetrated the palace through tunnels, while Skorzeny and his men occupied armored 
vehicles that encircled the palace.135 Infantry was needed to secure the pedestrian doors 
and entry and escape routes to and from the palace and surely to secure the palace itself 
after it was occupied. Following Winkelmann, Skorzeny’s unit performed the same 
functions as in Unternehmen Eiche; it supported an operation. 
It is also false that Horthy fled because of Skorzeny’s troops and did not give any 
orders for defending the palace, which contradicts Skorzeny’s autobiographical claims.136 
Horthy himself gave the order that there should no fight over the palace,137 which may be 
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influenced through the German military presence around the Burgberg. It was also not 
Skorzeny’s men who pressed Horthy to resign, but SS-Brigadeführer and representative 
of the German Reich in Hungary, Edmund Vessenmayer, and the diplomat Rudolf Rahn 
negotiated with Horthy to resign.138 Thus, Unternehmen Panzerfaust and the palace raid 
may have influenced Horthy’s resignation, but they were not the main impetus. 
To summarize the findings of Unternehmen Panzerfaust, Skorzeny did not play a 
major role in capturing Horthy Jr. and was only a supporting commander for the palace 
occupation mission in Budapest. SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski and SS-
Standartenführer Zehender held overall responsibility, while Skorzeny’s men only had to 
secure the palace, where the Hungarian guards were ordered not to fight.  
D. CONCLUSION 
To conclude the findings of this chapter, the critique on Skorzeny’s involvement 
in Unternehmen Eiche and Unternehmen Panzerfaust has shown that Skorzeny did not 
plan and conduct these German special operations independently, as he claims with his 
narrative.139 
The purpose of z.b.V. Friedenthal was not to conduct battalion-sized special 
operations. However, after Unternehmen Eiche the unit began to develop into SS-
Jagdverbände and gain tactical experience for further conduction of special 
operations.140 In the beginning, German paratroopers provided tactical experience and 
executed these types of missions. Nevertheless, Skorzeny and his men provided 
intelligence and therefore, located Mussolini, which set the conditions for the launch of 
Unternehmen Eiche.141 In this phase of German special operations, and partly also during 
Unternehmen Panzerfaust, Skorzeny’s unit supported tactically-tasked units to conduct 
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the mission. NS-propaganda played a major role in the creation of Skorzeny’s fame 
concerning the conduct of German special operations. German propaganda at that time 
had a need for men like Skorzeny and therefore, he served a political and militarily 
purpose, while differing operation reports were ignored and denied by Joseph 
Goebbels.142 These factors bolstered Skorzeny’s fame during and after World War II. 
However, Otto Skorzeny still had a strategic impact on World War II, despite the 
inconsistencies in his memory of his own role in the two operations on which this thesis 
focuses. Furthermore, other actions influenced his rise to fame. 
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IV. SKORZENY’S STRATEGIC VALUE 
German special operations are historically connected with Otto Skorzeny, who 
attained global recognition during and after World War II, even up until now.143 This 
thesis identifies Skorzeny’s strategic and tactical contributions and presents current 
discussion about his legacy and missions. His personality and the special operations that 
are connected to him all have aided to his strategic impact. 
This chapter will argue that Otto Skorzeny and the German special operations, 
which are connected to his name had a strategic impact for Germany during World War 
II on four levels. Firstly, by using Skorzeny as the main leader of German special 
operations, he fit into the overall propaganda agenda to influence the German population 
to support the war and the German NS-government. Skorzeny’s role contributed to 
initially successful German domestic information operations that mainly targeted their 
own populations. Secondly, the SS was using Skorzeny and his missions for recruiting 
volunteers and improving and sustaining military morale. This was evident based on the 
fact that SS-soldiers continued to fight with low rates of surrender, even when clearly at a 
tactical and operational disadvantage. Thirdly, Germany presented itself as strong and 
coerced its allies fighting on the German side, while providing German troops a “secure” 
environment for its battles. Lastly, it influenced Allied headquarters’ decisions for 
tactical and operational use of their forces, which had strategic impacts for German 
warfighting. 
A. GERMAN POPULATION 
After spring of 1943 when the Soviet Red Army had won the battle of Stalingrad 
and the 6th Army was neutralized and captured, the German population’s support for the 
NS-regime was decreasing.144 Allied bombers already bombed the German homeland,  
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and air defense was only partially available and could not deter Allied bomber raids.145 
At that point, many Germans in larger cities had already lost their homes and loved ones 
because of the war. Now, a whole army on the Eastern Front was completely eliminated 
and domestic popular support for the war dropped significantly.146 The German people 
became increasingly disenchanted with the war and less convinced that all German 
adversaries had to be defeated.147 
The German government needed to reinvigorate the German population’s 
commitment, and the Otto Skorzeny narrative helped to serve this purpose. With the 
reports on Skorzeny and his special missions, NS-propaganda aimed to foster an 
atmosphere of strength, which attempted to demonstrate German warfighting’s ability to 
withstand the Allied pressure.148 It focused on a man, who still believed in the German 
fighting capacity to win. Psychologically, Skorzeny affected the German population’s 
hearts and minds, and aroused them to have hope for the future and trust the German 
government and military leadership, despite instances of defeat.149 Skorzeny functions as 
one piece of the propaganda campaign puzzle. The NS-propaganda campaign inspired 
and maintained German popular support for German political and military goals through 
manipulation of information and even staging events.150 Media reports provided heroes 
SS-members like Skorzeny, Eicke, and Meyer and highlighted their and other military 
successes. These efforts translated into successful influence of the German population.151 
This concept of propaganda was effective, and at the beginning of 1943, Joseph Goebbels 
proclaimed the “Total War,” and people cheered about this prospect.152 Popular support 
for the German government was crucial while the Allied Forces were attacking and 
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defeating German military on nearly all fronts und pushing towards the German 
homeland. For the NS-regime Otto Skorzeny had a strategic impact on popular support 
for keeping the war ongoing and govern as they did. 
B. SS-VOLUNTEERING/WARFIGHTING 
An increasing challenge for the Waffen-SS, the Reichsführer-SS Heinrich 
Himmler experienced difficulty recruiting volunteers until the end of 1942.153 The 
intensity of the war and the heavy losses of SS-members was decreasing the size of its 
divisions.154 The SS started to create volunteer-programs to gather enough young men for 
fighting the war on Germany’s side. These advertisements and volunteer recruitment 
programs were spread all over Europe to create foreign SS-Divisions with “Nordic” 
looking men fighting for the NS-idea.155 NS-propaganda supported this volunteer-
program by reporting about successful special operations, which seem to be not feasible, 
but were conducted by German SS-members.156 Furthermore, these SS-men seem to 
prove the superiority of their units.157 
Moreover, Allied forces were attacking successfully and forcing the German 
military to retreat on all fronts, and Skorzeny and his missions provided the archetypical 
valiant German soldier, who never gives up and fights as long as he can.158 Propaganda 
reported and used this ethos to influence other soldiers to keep up their morale and push 
Allied attacks back while defending doggedly German positions.159 Therefore, 
Skorzeny’s valiant archetype had a strategic impact on the battleground and on German 
morale. 
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C. GERMAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE 
This thesis has already painted the Unternehmen Eiche and Unternehmen 
Panzerfaust strategic environment. Because German propaganda connected Skorzeny’s 
name to these special missions and their claimed successes, he and these end states had a 
strategic impact on the political and militarily environment. Both case studies focus on a 
crucial period for Germany and its military. 
Politically, Skorzeny’s special operations served to demonstrate to Germany’s 
allies and regents that the Führer Adolph Hitler would go to all lengths necessary to 
provide military support and conduct rescue and liberation operations, as in the case of 
Mussolini’s rescue. Conversely, in the operation concerning Horthy and his son, this 
demonstrated that Germany would take the necessary steps to depose any traitors.160 
Therefore, Skorzeny’s political strategic value laid in the capability to influence German 
allies to stay on their side and fight for Germany and thus deter any defection from the 
alliance.161 
The strategic value of Skorzeny for the German military laid in developing a 
“secure” environment.162 The German military did not have to fight in a hostile country 
because (Northern) Italy and Hungary remained German allies. If Italy and Hungary 
would have changed their side to the Allied forces, Germany’s divisions would have been 
cut off in a then hostile environment, and troops which were fighting with Germany 
together would have become enemies overnight.163 Suddenly the whole tactical, 
operational, strategic environment for the German military would have changed. By 
influencing politically (Northern) Italy and Hungary to continue to fight alongside 
Germany, these governments provided troops, military support, and internal state security 
for German units.164 Italy’s Fascist Salo Republic fought on Germany’s side nearly until 
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the end of the war, and Budapest defended itself with German units for nearly six more 
months and therefore, blocked Red Army troops and provided cover for the withdrawal 
of German troops.165 
D. INFLUENCING GERMAN ADVERSARIES 
Skorzeny at the center of NS propaganda influenced Germany’s adversaries in 
two significant ways. First, it had a psychological impact on the Allies. The recognition 
of Skorzeny and his special operations proved the existence of German military 
capability to successfully conduct these types of missions, despite Allied Forces closing 
in on German forces from all fronts.166 
Second, these missions’ psychological influence had tangible impacts on Allied 
forces. Especially during and after the Ardennenoffensive,167 where Skorzeny conducted 
a false-flag operation named Unternehmen Greif against the United States and during 
which Skorzeny’s men claimed that they assassinated General Eisenhower in order to 
provoke anxiety in the Allied Headquarters in Paris and tie up U.S. forces with the search 
for Skorzeny and his men. These psychological operations had positive effects; American 
troops who protected General Eisenhower became increasingly on edge, and American 
troops as a whole became agitated when numerous American Prisoners of War were 
claimed to be Germans or German agents.168 Therefore, over time Skorzeny’s fame and 
the German capability to conduct special operations like Unternehmen Eiche and 
Unternehmen Panzerfaust stressed Allied headquarters, which resulted in decisions for 
stationing troops or using troops in a way, which otherwise would not have happened.169 
Also the conduct of Skorzeny’s special operations influenced foundation and 
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development of the Werwolf organization, which was created in 1944 to fight as a 
German resistance force even in Allied occupied territory.170 Although the Werwolf 
operation was exaggerated,171 this fear led the Allies to commit more forces to rear area 
security than usual.172 
E. CONCLUSION 
The strategic value of Skorzeny for Germany’s political and military influence are 
extant, although this thesis stated in its Chapter “Critiques” that he had a more minor 
involvement in the special operations Unternehmen Eiche and Unternehmen Panzerfaust 
than he stated in his memoirs. 
Through Skorzeny’s presence in German propaganda, the strategic influence of 
his archetype translated to popular support for the war and the NS-regime, the support for 
recruitment of SS-volunteers, the strategic influential character on Germany’s allies and 
therefore, for Germany’s military, and lastly on Germany’s adversaries, who were 
influenced psychologically with tangible impacts. All strategic influence by Skorzeny’s 







                                                 
170 Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando, 109–111, 117. 
171 Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando, 111; Rodney Kennedy-Minott, The Fortress that Never 
Was: The Myth of Hitler’s Bavarian Stronghold (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964). 
172 Infield, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando, 111. 
 41
V. THE REAL CONDUCT 
According to the thesis’ description of the strategic environment and the critiques 
about Skorzeny’s involvement into the German special operations Unternehmen Eiche 
and Unternehmen Panzerfaust, this chapter will draw the lines of operation during the 
German missions. The two case studies will not be described in great detail but these 
sections will provide a focus on the “real” conduct and the relationship about Skorzeny 
and his involvement, his commanding position, and the influence and responsibility he 
had in for these German special operations.173  
A. CONDUCTING UNTERNEHMEN EICHE 
According to the findings of the critical analysis, this section will draw the 
operation in two segments. The first part will describe the finding of Mussolini and 
Skorzeny’s responsibilities, while the second part will describe the actual tactical 
liberation of Mussolini at Gran Sasso. 
General Student was most likely the tasked officer for liberating Mussolini 
because of his available paratroopers who had been preparing for the defense of Rome 
and their experience and capability to conduct such special operations. General Student 
alone could not locate Mussolini, which led Student to formally request intelligence 
support. This resulted in Skorzeny and parts of his z.b.V. Friedenthal attaching to General 
Student’s command. 
Skorzeny’s mission was to locate Mussolini, and he worked closely together with 
SS-Sturmbannführer Kappler, who assisted the German embassy in Rome and had 
contacts to the Italian police and SS-Obersturmbannführer Dollmann, who was the 
liaison officer of the Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) in Rome, who had contacts to the 
Italian elites. Initially, the German intelligence picture was incomplete, and the Germans 
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did not know, that Mussolini was imprisoned close to General Kesselring’s headquarters 
and was brought on July 28, 1943 to the island of Ponza, where he stayed until August 7, 
1943. On August 8, 1943, Mussolini was brought to the island of La Maddalena, and 
Skorzeny became informed about this location. After he sent one of his men to the island 
to confirm Mussolini’s imprisonment on the island, Skorzeny himself went to the island 
and verified the findings. General Student received Skorzeny’s confirmation and planned 
a rescue operation under support of the German Navy. But the Italians had anticipated a 
German rescue operation and flew Mussolini to an airbase Northwest of Rome on August 
28, 1943 and by car on September 1, 1943 to the Hotel Imperatore at Gran Sasso to 
impede the rescue attempt. Before the planned German liberation of Mussolini on La 
Maddalena was launched by Student, Skorzeny went to the island and heard policemen 
speaking about Mussolini’s relocation. 
At that point, German intelligence again lost contact with Mussolini and thus his 
location. Kappler found a trace within a recorded phone call of the chief of police, which 
Kappler passed to Student and Skorzeny. Now, three independently and non-coordinated 
reconnaissance missions were launched. Student sent Lieutenant Leo Krutoff to the Hotel 
Imperatore under the cover of searching for a possible convalescent site for German 
troops. Kappler sent his deputy SS-Obersturmführer, Erich Priebke, and Skorzeny 
himself with his deputy Radl went on a Heinkel-111 bomber to take aerial photographs. 
All aerial reconnaissance missions indicated that Mussolini was imprisoned at the hotel 
on Gran Sasso. 
Ideally, Unternehmen Eiche would have directly followed the confirmation of 
Mussolini’s location, but Italian politics prevented the German mission. On September 8, 
1943, Allied radios broadcasted the Italian surrender, and Kesselring being the 
commanding general in Italy directed all available German troops to disarm Italian troops 
and defeat the Italian resistance. Student’s Fallschirmjäger and even Skorzeny’s men 
came under Kesselring’s order and became part of the Italian overthrow by German 
troops. On September 11, 1943, Rome was secured and under German control. General 
Student and his men started to plan for the liberation of Mussolini. 
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General Student ordered an airborne assault with 12 gliders DFS-230 under Major 
Harald Mors’ command. Major Harald Mors being the regimental commander planned 
the operation and gave Oberleutnant Georg Freiher von Berlepsch the task of the assault 
company landing on Gran Sasso to free Mussolini. Mors himself and the rest of his 
regiment would secure the base station of Gran Sasso. At that point Skorzeny’s task was 
done and he would not have any further involvement into the mission. 
On September 12, 1943, General Student launched Unternehmen Eiche. Before it 
started,174 Skorzeny asked General Student to participate in the operation, to which 
Student agreed and confirmed 17 men to join Skorzeny, while von Berlepsch and Mors 
were informed that Skorzeny would have no competence and his men would support von 
Berlepsch’s company to conduct the mission. Furthermore, Skorzeny brought the Italian 
Brigadier General Fernando Soleti to the airport and hoped the participating General 
would prevent the Italian Gran Sasso guards from shooting. 
The gliders were hitched and took off ahead of Gran Sasso in an original 
formation of three glider rows in a time difference of two minutes. They soon broke apart 
because the leading row took a circling flying maneuver to climb up in height above Gran 
Sasso while the following two rows stood in direct direction towards Gran Sasso. This 
maneuver led to Skorzeny’s leading flying position. 
When the gliders landed around the Hotel Imperatore on Gran Sasso, Skorzeny 
took his men and ran towards the hotel while the Fallschirmjäger followed their orders 
and took position around the hotel securing the possible battlefield until von Berlepsch’s 
glider landed, and he led his company. Von Berlepsch made sure his company had taken 
its positions and went with some of his men towards the hotel, where Skorzeny already 
had found Mussolini inside. Oberleutnant von Berlepsch reported Major Mors mission 
accomplished and Mors came up to the Hotel Imperatore. 
General Student had ordered to exfiltrate Mussolini either on land or by air. 
Therefore, he had provided two two-seated FI-156 Fieseler Storche, which should take 
Mussolini and Skorzeny to the airport. But one FI-156 damaged its undercarriage before 
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it could be used for the exfiltration. Student’s personal pilot Hauptmann Heinrich 
Gerlach flew the other FI-156 and arrived on Gran Sasso and wanted to fly with 
Mussolini alone to the next airport, but Skorzeny convinced the pilot to exfiltrate with 
Mussolini on the two-seated light aircraft. 
Furthermore, Skorzeny accompanied Mussolini until his arrival in Germany. 
B. CONDUCTING UNTERNEHMEN PANZERFAUST 
After Unternehmen Margarethe and the German occupation of Hungary in March 
1944, German intelligence picked up on the Hungarian Regent’s attempt to contact the 
Soviet Red Army to negotiate a Hungarian surrender or ceasefire. Adolf Hitler most 
likely tasked the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler to plan and conduct Unternehmen 
Panzerfaust to either press the Hungarian Regent Miklós Horthy to remain a German ally 
or to resign. Through the chain of command, the Hungarian Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer 
Otto Winkelmann got tasked with this mission and SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem 
Bach-Zelewski became the commanding senior officer for this operation, probably 
because of his experience in defeating the Warsaw uprising in August 1944, and his 
position of being the head of the German Bandenbekämpfung175 in the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the decision to conduct this operation in Budapest would have been in 
September or early October 1944. Otto Skorzeny must have been informed about the 
preplanned operation around the same time. His task was most likely to support 
Winkelmann and von dem Bach-Zelewski in the conduct of this operation because of his 
lower rank than all other involved military officials and his SS-Jäger-Bataillon 502, 
which did not have enough strength to conduct the operation all alone. 
The Unternehmen Panzerfaust itself was a mission focused on the attack the 
Budapest castle hill where Horthy’s palace was located and focused on Horthy’s capture 
and imprisonment. Winkelmann and his SS policemen trapped the Hungarian Regent’s 
son Niklas Horthy on October 15, 1944, in order to negotiate with members of the 
Yugoslavian resistance under Tito, while Skorzeny and his men supported the operation. 
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Skorzeny’s task was likely solely to secure Horthy Jr.’s capture and the way to the airport 
while Winkelmann’s men brought Horthy Jr. to an airplane to transport him to Germany. 
The German representative Veesenmayer negotiated at 12:00 am with the 
Hungarian Regent Horthy to either stay on Germany’s side during the war or to resign, 
while Horthy proclaimed a ceasefire via radio. Winkelmann’s SS-occupied the radio 
station and Winkelmann launched Unternehmen Panzerfaust to press Horthy to resign. 
SS-Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zelewski, being militarily responsible for 
conducting this operation, gave the command to SS-Standartenführer Zehender to lead. 
Under Zehender’s command the 22. SS-Freiwilligen-Kavallerie-Division with attached 
Tiger tanks, the SS-Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 600, and Skorzeny’s SS-Jäger-Bataillon 
502. The SS-Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 600 had to penetrate the Burgberg of Horthy’s 
palace through a tunnel, while all other involved German forces were the blocking forces 
around the castle hill.  
Overnight, Veesenmayer and the German diplomat Rudolf Rahn negotiated with 
Horthy until he agreed to resign and left his palace with Veesenmayer nearly 30 minutes 
before 06:00 am in the morning of October 16, 1944. Before Horthy left, he ordered his 
guarding troops not to defend the Burgberg to ensure no Hungarian and German deaths. 
Zehender’s troops were not informed about Horthy’s resignation and therefore, 
Skorzeny’s men, who were the only involved infantry, stormed the palace at 6:00 am and 
had minor fights with Hungarian units, who did not receive Horthy’s orders. 
Simultaneously, as Skorzeny’s men stormed the mostly undefended palace, the 
men of SS-Fallschirmjäger-Bataillon 600 arrived. Together, they occupied and secured 
the palace. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The intention of this thesis was to describe Otto Skorzeny’s real role in the origin, 
planning, execution, and aftermath of German high-value-target special operations in 
World War II. Therefore, I concentrated on two case studies, which provided the strategic 
impact for Germany’s war in the south with Unternehmen Eiche 1943 in Italy and in the 
southeast with Unternehmen Panzerfaust 1944 in Hungary. 
Unternehmen Eiche was to liberate Mussolini and Unternehmen Panzerfaust 
aimed Horthy to resign. Otto Skorzeny presents himself during both operations as being 
personally tasked by Adolf Hitler and having planned and conducted these operations. 
Skorzeny claims he had the commanding power over all involved military units and had 
been responsible overall.176 
The comparison with other witnesses of these case studies showed that Otto 
Skorzeny was involved into both special operations but with command-responsibility 
than he claims in his books. In both cases, Skorzeny and his men were attached to a 
larger military unit and were only partially tasked with independent planning and 
conducting of missions. Mostly, Skorzeny’s task was to provide intelligence and 
information. The use of infantry and special forces’ tactics was not the initial purpose of 
Skorzeny’s units because their task was more agent-like although they likely improved 
their military skills over time and by participating in special operations. Further academic 
work should investigate other special operations in which Skorzeny was involved.  
Furthermore, the critiques about Skorzeny’s narrative have shown that academics 
and historians should be critical and careful when referencing his work. Otto Skorzeny 
published his books in the postwar period starting in France and later in Germany. His 
books did not meet academic standards and were not written as official historical 
accounts about German special operations during World War II, but rather were written 
to appear to popular readership and earn money. His narrative must be understood in the 
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environment of postwar Germany, where the government and people needed stories about 
the war and the brave, hard, unpolitical, and honorable German soldier, who fought a 
justified war. War crimes never happen in these stories and the member of the Waffen-SS 
is depicted as a regular soldier of the Wehrmacht. Current academic work denies this 
narrative. Therefore, the reader must understand Skorzeny’s books as a mixture of 
autobiographic and fictional adventure. Nevertheless, there is always some truth in these 
stories, and Skorzeny created fiction around personal experience, opinion, and the truth in 
the stories core. Students have to be aware about these tensions and may use Skorzeny’s 
narrative after compared it with current academic works on the topic. 
Additionally, the thesis showed the huge influence of National Socialist 
propaganda on Skorzeny’s fame. The National Socialist propaganda as part of the regime 
had a specific interest in creating heroes like Skorzeny. Even the SS itself needed the 
reporting about men like Skorzeny to overcome its decreasing number of volunteers. 
Skorzeny’s fame results in the production of national socialist propaganda, which 
reported about the special missions although the real conduct was known. The result of 
this construct is a recognizable strategic value of Skorzeny himself, which provided as a 
part of German propaganda popular support for the National Socialist government, 
overcome of decreasing SS members, stabilizing militarily dangerous situations, and fear 
and biases on the side of the Allied Forces with influences on their decisions. 
Further academic work should concentrate on other Skorzeny-conducted special 
missions to support or discuss the findings of this thesis. Also, German postwar literature 
or movies provide an interesting research base to help understanding the intentions the 
authors had and therefore, provide a better use of these products for academia.  
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APPENDIX. MILITARY RANKS 
SS-Rank   Wehrmacht  US-Army 
SS-Oberstgruppenführer Generaloberst  Colonel-General 
SS-Obergruppenführer General  General 
SS-Gruppenführer  Generalleutnant Lieutenant-General 
SS-Brigadeführer  Generalmajor  Major-General 
SS-Oberführer   -   Brigadier-General 
SS-Standartenführer  Oberst   Colonel 
SS-Obersturmbannführer Oberstleutnant  Lieutenant-Colonel 
SS-Sturmbannführer  Major   Major 
SS-Hauptsturmführer  Hauptmann  Captain 
SS-Obersturmführer  Oberleutnant  1st Lieutenant 
SS-Untersturmführer  Leutnant  2nd Lieutenant 
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